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bstract
This paper examines the relationship between product market competition and intra-industry momentum returns. Based on 12,982 firm obser-
ations from 19 developed markets for the period of 1990–2010, I find that buying winners and selling losers in competitive industries generates
ignificantly higher momentum profits than that in concentrated industries. The higher the intensity of product market competition, the larger are
he intra-industry momentum returns. The results are robust to sub-samples (periods) of the U.S., non-U.S. countries, the G7 countries, 1990–2000,
nd 2001–2010. I further employ the nearness of a stock’s price to the 52-week high to determine past winners and losers and find stronger results.
 also compare intra-industry momentum returns with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) individual stock momentum and Moskowitz and Grinblatt
1999) inter-industry momentum strategies. My results suggest that intra-industry momentum strategy outperforms the latter two strategies in most
ases. The overall results are consistent with the notion that severe product market competition induces managers to improve financial performance. 2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
EL classiﬁcation: F30; G11; G14; G15
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p.  Introduction
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) have spurred an increasing
umber of studies on stock return momentum over various
nvestment horizons. Subsequent studies have attempted to
xplain this return phenomenon. Examples of such expla-
ations include, among others, market’s under-reactions to
arnings information (Chan et al., 1996), industry momentum
Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999), and stock-specific component
o returns (Grundy and Martin, 2001).
The nature of product market competition influences firms’
perating decisions from all aspects and hence, firms’ cash flows
 I am grateful for the insightful comments and suggestions from Lilian Ng,
ohui Zhang, Mike Qinghao Mao, Revansiddha Basavaraj Khanapure, seminar
articipants at the Lubar School of Business, and participants of 2013 Asian
inance Association Annual Meeting in Nanchang, Jiangxi, China, and 2014
astern Finance Association Annual Meeting in Pittsburgh, PA.
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879-9337/© 2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. And equilibrium rates of return. The extant literature regard-
ng product market competition documents that the intensity of
ndustry competition affects stock returns. Specifically, firms
n more competitive industries earn higher stock returns (Hou
nd Robinson, 2006), and have lower abnormal stock returns
nd cash flows following the occurrence of high industry-level
nancing and stock market valuation (Hoberg and Phillips,
010). Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) claim that industry
omentum is a key origin of individual stock momentum, and
hat stocks within an industry are more likely to associate with
ach other. Yet the relationship between industry concentration
nd momentum profits has not been explored. I am interested
n investigating whether the competitiveness of an industry has
ny influence on momentum returns within the industry.
In this paper, I conduct an international analysis to examine
hether product market competition matters for momentum
rofits. In more competitive industries, fundamental structures
f firms are similar and comparable. Therefore, negative
positive) shocks can be more fatal (favorable) to firms in a
ompetitive industry, given that firms in competitive industries
ave high pressures. If a firm makes one simple mistake in
ll rights reserved.
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 competitive industry, it can be easily excluded from that
ndustry. Thus firms in competitive industries have stronger
otivations to thrive. I posit that buying past winners and
elling past losers in competitive industries will generate
ore momentum returns. Product market competition is more
onvincing than industry itself in explaining momentum returns.
My sample includes firms from 19 countries for the period of
990–2010. I measure product market competition by using the
erfindahl Index (also known as Herfindahl–Hirschman Index,
r HHI), which is computed as the sum of squared market shares
n each of the ICBIN industries and measures industry level com-
etition. I focus on the 12-month/3-month strategy, which is
egarded as the most successful zero-cost strategy by Jegadeesh
nd Titman (1993), to determine past performance and the subse-
uent holding period. To avoid bid-ask bounce, I skip one month
etween the formation period and holding period. At the begin-
ing of every month t, within each HHI portfolio, I compute the
verage returns of the past 12 months for each stock and rank
he average returns in a descending order. The top 30% stocks
re considered winners, and the bottom 30% stocks are regarded
s losers. In month t  + 1, I buy past winners, sell past losers, and
old this position for 3 months. The momentum profits aris-
ng from this strategy in every HHI portfolio are intra-industry
omentum returns. I find that among the 19 countries in the
ample, there are significant intra-industry momentum profits in
ompetitive industries and less or no intra-industry momentum
rofits in concentrated industries.
I further find consistent support in sub-samples of the U.S.,
on-U.S. countries, the G7 countries, sub-period 1990–2000,
nd sub-period 2001–2010 that intra-industry momentum prof-
ts are decreasing or disappearing with industry concentration.
he Fama–MacBeth regressions of intra-industry momentum
eturns on measures of competitiveness imply a negative associ-
tion between industry concentration and momentum returns.
n addition, following George and Hwang (2004), I employ
he nearness of a stock’s price to the 52-week high to deter-
ine winners and losers, and the results are consistent and more
conomically significant.
Lastly, I compare intra-industry momentum with indi-
idual stock momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and
nter-industry momentum (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). I
ompute annualized momentum profits of these three strategies,
mploy univariate analysis in different samples, and conduct
LS regressions with Jegadeesh and Titman momentum prof-
ts as dependent variables. The results imply that in non-U.S.
ountries and sub-period 2001–2010 intra-industry momentum
trategies outperform the other two strategies, and intra-industry
omentum profits are more closely associated with Jegadeesh
nd Titman momentum profits.
This study contributes to the momentum literature in several
ignificant ways. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the
rst study that examines the relationship between intra-industry
omentum and product market competition. Moskowitz and
rinblatt (1999) present a strong and persistent industry
omentum phenomenon, while Hou and Robinson (2006)
nd Lyandres and Watanabe (2012) report the association
etween stock returns and competition. I expand these studies
a
M
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y classifying industries by their product market competition
evels, and showing that the degree of competitiveness positively
ffects momentum.
Second, I extend the literature by examining how the inten-
ity of competition influences momentum profits in 19 developed
ountries. Rouwenhorst (1998) extends Jegadeesh and Titman
1993) in an international context and shows that stock momen-
um exists in 12 European countries in the sample. Griffin et al.
2003) argue that macroeconomic risk variables are not able to
xplain stock return continuation. Chui et al. (2000, 2010) focus
n the effects of culture, the legal system, and the ownership
tructure on momentum. No international study has shed light on
he relationship between competitiveness and momentum strat-
gy. I explore the stock momentum of developed countries from
he perspective of competition intensity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
ion 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 describes the data
nd methodology. Section 4 provides univariate and multivari-
te tests to compare momentum returns in competitive industries
nd concentrated industries. Section 5 concludes the paper.
.  Literature  review
.1.  Momentum
Momentum, referred to as relative strength strategies, has
eceived great attention from recent finance literature. Jegadeesh
nd Titman (1993) mention that practitioners who use momen-
um strategies form the portfolios based on price movements
ver the 3- to 12-month horizons. They find that firms with
igh returns over the past 3–12 months continue to outperform
rms with low past returns over the same horizons, while firms
ith low returns continue to underperform firms with high past
eturns.
After the momentum strategy was documented, substantial
tudies have been trying to identify the sources of abnormal
eturns from momentum. Chan et al. (1996) state that the market
cts in response to new information gradually, and the market’s
nder-reaction to earnings information can partly explain the
redictability of future returns from past returns. Moskowitz
nd Grinblatt (1999) claim that industry momentum explains
uch of the individual stock momentum profits at intermediate
nvestment horizons. Once industry effects are taken into consid-
ration, momentum in individual equities virtually do not exist.
uch of the individual stock momentum anomaly can be justi-
ed by industry momentum profits. They point out that stocks
ithin an industry tend to be highly correlated, and the past
inners and losers are likely to come from the same industry.
herefore, the relative strength strategies are not well diversified.
Moreover, Grundy and Martin (2001) show that the prof-
tability of relative strength strategy reflects momentum in the
tock-specific component of returns. It cannot be explained as a
eward for bearing the dynamic exposure to cross-sectional vari-
bility in stocks’ average returns or exposure to industry factors.
omentum strategies that determine winner or loser status by
tock-specific return components are more profitable in contrast
o those determined by total returns.
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In addition to the traditional momentum strategies of
egadeesh and Titman (1993), George and Hwang (2004) report
hat the nearness of a stock’s price to 52-week high has better
redictive power of both past individual and industry returns for
uture returns. A stock whose price is at or near its 52-week high
s a stock for which good news has been completely incorpo-
ated in the price. Buying winners and selling losers identified
y the 52-week high generates returns about twice as large as
hose produced by the other momentum strategies.
.2.  Momentum  around  the  world
With substantial studies documenting the profound and
obust momentum profits over an intermediate horizon on the
nited States market, a growing body of literature has focused
n the international markets. Rouwenhorst (1998) extends
egadeesh and Titman (1993) in an international context by
nvestigating firms from 12 European countries. They show that
he momentum of prior stock returns exists in the 12 coun-
ries and holds for both large and small firms. They argue that
he international momentum profits are significantly correlated
ith those in the United States, addressing the concern that the
pparent momentum anomalies in the United States may be the
utcome of a data snooping process.
Griffin et al. (2003) further explore the relationship between
omentum returns and macroeconomic risk across the world.
hey examine the validity of Chen et al. (1986) unconditional
odel and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) conditional model in
xplaining momentum profits and present that macroeconomic
isk variables are not able to explain momentum. Moreover, they
laim that international momentum returns are generally positive
n both good and bad economic states.
Focusing on eight Asian countries, Chui et al. (2000) examine
omentum from the perspective of ownership structure, legal
ystems, and valuation uncertainty, since cultural and institu-
ional differences may influence investment decisions, thereby
ffecting momentum profits. They find that significant momen-
um exists in Asian markets except Japan, though the magnitude
nd pervasiveness of relative strength returns are relatively
eaker in comparison to that in the United States and Europe.
hui et al. (2010) use the individualism index, developed by
ofstede et al. (1991), to measure cross-country cultural dif-
erences and indicate that individualism is positively correlated
ith trading volume, volatility, and the magnitude of momen-
um profits. They report that Asian countries, such as China and
outh Korea, have very low individualism scores; hence they do
ot have momentum profits.
Asness et al. (2013) shed light on two market anomalies-
eturns to value and momentum strategies-by investigating their
eturns across eight diverse markets and asset classes (includ-
ng individual stocks in the U.S., U.K., continental Europe, and
apan, country equity index futures, government bonds, cur-
encies, and commodity futures). They find consistent return
remiums to value and momentum premiums globally across
arious asset classes, and confirm the existence of common
lobal risks.
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.3.  Product  market  competition
There is a growing body of literature investigating how
roduct market competition influences equity returns. The inten-
ity of competition reflects firms’ strategic interactions among
arket participants. Firms’ operation decisions resulting from
ndustry competitiveness influence cash flows riskiness, and
nvestors’ valuation of firm values in financial markets, and
ence firms’ equilibrium rates of return (Hou and Robinson,
006; Lyandres and Watanabe, 2012).
Hou and Robinson (2006) offer the first empirical evidence
hat the intensity of product market competition has a sig-
ificantly positive relationship with stock returns, both at the
ndustry level and the firm level. They point out potential
easons to explain the lower returns associated with concen-
rated industries. Industries with less competition have lower
nnovation risk and distress risk, which lead to lower stock
eturns.
Aguerrevere (2009), however, argues that lower innovation
isk and distress risk cannot explain how the market struc-
ure affects the risk dynamics of firms in a given industry. To
nderstand the asset pricing implications of product market
ompetition, the author investigates the relationship between
trategic behaviors of market participants and their equilibrium
nvestment and production decisions. The empirical results show
hat product market demand has an impact on the association
etween the intensity of competition and the firms’ exposure
o non-diversifiable risk. In the concentrated industries, firms
re riskier when product market demand is high, however,
n the competitive industries, firms are risker when demand
s low.
Industries often go through cycles. Hoberg and Phillips
2010) show how the degree of product market concentration
nteracts with firm cash flows and stock returns in the cycles of
oom and bust. They find that in competitive industries, sharply
ower abnormal stock returns and operating cash flows follow
igh industry-level stock market valuation, financing and invest-
ent.
Lyandres and Watanabe (2012) build an industry equilibrium
odel featuring investors, consumers, and firms that compete in
 concentrated market. The empirical results support the model’s
rojection that the effects of competition on expected returns are
ot uniform across firms, complementing the findings in Hou and
obinson (2006) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010). They suggest
hat the competitiveness in product markets and firms’ compet-
tive positions relative to their industry rivals are economically
ignificant determinants of the cross-sectional variation in equity
eturns.
.  Data  and  methodology
This study includes 19 developed countries, which are
eported in Table 1. The sample period of my analysis spans from
anuary 1990 to December 2010. The sample consists of firm-
pecific financial variables from Worldscope and stock returns
rom Datastream.
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Table 1
Summary statistics.
Country NFirms Annualized returns Herfindahl Index
Mean Median STD Mean Median STD
Australia 839 0.198 0.129 0.421 0.296 0.269 0.069
Belgium 100 0.092 0.124 0.231 0.536 0.536 0.050
Canada 672 0.208 0.254 0.355 0.161 0.142 0.049
Denmark 165 0.108 0.128 0.300 0.463 0.442 0.067
Finland 97 0.134 0.149 0.313 0.496 0.513 0.045
France 629 0.130 0.115 0.233 0.286 0.284 0.028
Germany 560 0.085 0.118 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.021
Hong Kong 592 0.230 0.258 0.424 0.273 0.207 0.121
Italy 215 0.059 0.068 0.273 0.348 0.352 0.035
Japan 2383 0.048 0.025 0.292 0.107 0.098 0.022
Netherlands 140 0.122 0.133 0.251 0.481 0.493 0.031
New Zealand 72 0.142 0.231 0.299 0.529 0.536 0.097
Norway 140 0.153 0.201 0.434 0.448 0.456 0.025
Singapore 313 0.169 0.074 0.422 0.338 0.328 0.120
Spain 122 0.102 0.180 0.293 0.350 0.346 0.034
Sweden 241 0.128 0.183 0.376 0.397 0.368 0.064
Switzerland 203 0.124 0.173 0.230 0.365 0.398 0.064
United Kingdom 1467 0.103 0.090 0.344 0.184 0.185 0.012
United States 4032 0.194 0.237 0.243 0.051 0.050 0.007
This table provides summary statistics of means, medians, and standard deviation of annualized returns and the Herfindahl Index (HHI), as well as the number of
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4nique firms by countries. The Herfindahl Index (HHI) is defined as the sum of 
ivided by total sales in its industry of that country. The sample period is from 
.1.  Measure  of  competition  intensity
I employ the Herfindahl Index of concentration (HHI) to
roxy for product market competition. It is an industry level
ndex and measures the product market competitiveness among
rms within one industry. The industries are determined by
CBIN (Industry Classification Benchmark Industry Name). On
ne hand, if an industry consists of many firms with each one
aving a small market share, this industry is regarded as a com-
etitive industry. On the other hand, if there are only a few firms
elonging to one industry with each firm having a large market
hare, this industry is considered to be a concentrated industry.
The Herfindahl (HHI) is a measure of the sales of firms in
elation to the industry. It is calculated as
HIikt =
J∑
j=1
s2ijkt,
here sijkt is the market share of firm j in industry i  of country
 in year t. In year t, market share of a company is computed by
sing firms’ sales divided by total sales in its industry of country
. Then, firms in the same industry i of country k  in year t  are
ssigned to the same HHIikt. I exclude firms with missing sales
r missing ICBIN. A smaller HHI suggests the existence of a
arge number of competitive firms in an industry, while a greater
HI indicates that a few large firms dominate an industry and
hape its direction..2.  Momentum
When I compute the relative strength profits of each
ndustry in every country, first I employ the 12-month/3-month
n
r
p
sd market shares. Market share of a company is computed by using firms’ sales
ry 1990 to December 2010.
omentum strategy, which determines the past winners/losers
ased on past 12-month returns (from t −  12 to t  −  1). To
void bid-ask bounce, I skip one month (month t) before the
-month holding period (from t + 1 to t + 3). Every month,
n every country I rank the individual stocks in a descending
rder according to their past 12-month performance in each
ndustry. I take the top 30% stocks as winners and the bottom
0% stocks as losers. After skipping one month, I employ
he strategy of buying past winners and selling past losers,
nd hold this position for 3 months. The average returns are
qually weighted. The momentum profits arising from this
trategy in every HHI portfolio are intra-industry momentum
eturns.
In addition, I also use the nearness to the 52-week high
tock prices to determine past winners. Following George and
wang (2004) 52-week high strategy, I rank stock returns by
he nearness to the 52-week high. The returns are computed as
i,t−1/highi,t−1, where Pi,t−1 is the price of stock i at the end of
onth t −  1 and highi,t−1 is the highest price of stock i  during the
2-week period that ends on the last day of month t −  1. Within
ach industry, stocks are ranked based on Pi,t−1/highi,t−1 in a
escending order. Top 30% stocks are considered winners and
he bottom 30% of stocks are regarded as losers.
.  Does  product  market  competition  affect  momentum?
In this section, I test whether momentum profits are more pro-
ounced in competitive industries by employing univariate and
egression analyses. I compare the momentum returns of com-
etitive and concentrated industries in full sample and different
ub-samples (periods).
2 ment Finance 6 (2016) 16–25
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Table 2
Intra-industry momentum across different samples.
Competition level Winners (W) Losers (L) W − L
Panel A: all countries
Competitive industries 0.159 0.087 0.072***
(11.71)
2 0.173 0.123 0.050***
(11.14)
Concentrated industries 0.177 0.156 0.020
(1.57)
Panel B: the U.S.
Competitive industries 0.204 0.192 0.012*
(1.96)
2 0.221 0.215 0.005
(0.52)
Concentrated industries 0.229 0.254 −0.025
(−0.91)
Panel C: non-U.S. countries
Competitive industries 0.158 0.082 0.076***
(11.69)
2 0.170 0.116 0.054***
(11.20)
Concentrated industries 0.174 0.150 0.023
(1.69)
Panel D: G7 countries
Competitive industries 0.147 0.071 0.076**
(2.65)
2 0.155 0.110 0.045
(1.54)
Concentrated industries 0.186 0.136 0.049
(1.13)
Panel E: 1990–2000
Competitive industries 0.121 0.052 0.070***
(8.05)
2 0.154 0.105 0.049***
(7.69)
Concentrated industries 0.170 0.164 0.006
(0.31)
Panel F: 2001–2010
Competitive industries 0.194 0.119 0.075***
(8.50)
2 0.191 0.140 0.051***
(8.06)
Concentrated industries 0.184 0.150 0.034*
(2.03)
This table reports average annualized intra-industry momentum profits of indus-
tries with different competitiveness in the full sample (Panel A), sub-samples
of the U.S. (Panel B), the non-U.S. countries (Panel C), and the G7 countries
(Panel D), sub-period 1990–2000 (Panel E), and sub-period 2001–2010 (Panel
F). The annualized returns of winner portfolios, loser portfolios, and the zero-
cost portfolios of buying winners and selling losers are reported for competitive
industries, concentrated industries, and Group 2, respectively. The sample period
is from January 1990 to December 2010.
* Statistical significance at 10% level.
**
*
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.1.  Summary  statistics
Table 1 shows the number of firms included in each individual
ountry in this study, along with the means, medians, and stan-
ard deviation of annualized average returns and the Herfindahl
ndex across 19 countries. The U.S., Japan, the UK, Australia,
nd Canada have a larger number of firms compared with other
ountries in the sample. The U.S. has the lowest mean and
edian of the Herfindahl Index, which implies that the U.S. has
he most intense product market competition. Belgium and New
ealand have the highest Herfindahl Index, suggesting product
arkets in these two countries are the most concentrated.
.2.  Intra-industry  momentum  across  the  world
In this subsection, I examine how momentum profits are
ssociated with competitiveness by comparing the annualized
eturns of the zero-cost portfolios of buying winners and selling
osers in competitive and concentrated industries, respectively.
n general, there are 10 ICBIN industries and I should have
0 industry portfolios based on HHI. However, since not all
he countries have 10 ICBIN industries throughout the sam-
le period of 1990–2010, I define competitive and concentrated
ndustries as follows. I rank industries based on HHI in an
scending order every year in each country. If there are four
r five industries in a country, I take the top one as a competitive
ndustry and the bottom one as a concentrated industry. If there
re more than five industries in a country, I take the top two
s competitive industries and the bottom two as concentrated
ndustries. I compute intra-industry momentum returns within
ach individual industry respectively and take the average to
et momentum profits for competitive and concentrated indus-
ries. All the other industries are combined in the middle group
Group 2).
Table 2 presents the annualized returns of winner portfolios,
oser portfolios, and the portfolios of buying winners and selling
osers in competitive and concentrated industries, and Group 2.
anel A reports the results for all firms. In competitive industries
he annualized momentum return is 7.2% with a t-value of 11.71.
n Group 2, the annualized momentum return is 5% with a t-
alue of 11.14. Buying winners and selling losers generate more
omentum returns in competitive industries. However, there is
o significant momentum profit in concentrated industries.
To test whether the intra-industry momentum returns in
ompetitive industries are persistent, I conduct the analyses in
ifferent sub-samples (periods): the U.S., Non-U.S. countries,
he G7 countries (including Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
apan, the UK, and the U.S.), sub-period 1990–2000, and sub-
eriod 2001–2010. Panels B, C, and D present the intra-industry
omentum returns across different competition levels in the
.S., non-U.S. countries, and the G7 countries, respectively.
he results imply that in the U.S. and the G7 countries, there are
ignificant momentum profits in competitive industries, while
omentum returns are not significant in concentrated indus-
ries and Group 2. In non-U.S. countries, competitive industries
nd industries in Group 2 have significant momentum prof-
ts, and the profits are decreasing with industry concentration.
i
c
U
mStatistical significance at 5% level.
** Statistical significance at 1% level.
he annualized momentum profits of competitive industries
n the U.S. are relatively less compared with those in other
ountries. As indicated in Table 1, the product market in the
.S. is the most competitive one among the 19 countries. Thus
ost industries are competitive, and HHI is not dramatically
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ifferent across the three groups in the U.S. Due to this fact,
ompetitive industries in the U.S. do not generate as many
omentum returns as those in the other countries. Panel E and
anel F report the intra-industry momentum returns of competi-
ive and concentrated industries in the sub-periods of 1990–2000
nd 2001–2010, respectively. In both sub-periods, intra-industry
omentum profits are decreasing with industry concentration.
here is no momentum premium in concentrated industries in
he first sub-period.
The univariate results support my hypothesis that intra-
ndustry momentum returns are more pronounced in competitive
ndustries, which is persistent across different sub-samples (peri-
ds).
.3.  Cross-sectional  analyses
I proceed to estimate my hypothesis by Fama and MacBeth
1973) cross-sectional regressions. As stated in the previous sec-
ion, every year I rank industries by HHI in an ascending order
n every individual country. The range of the HHI ranks is from
our to ten depending on the number of industries each country
as every year. In every HHI portfolio, I use 12-month/3-month
trategy to identify the winners and losers. At the beginning of
very month t, I compute the average returns of every stock based
n past 12-month (from t −  12 to t  −  1) performance. The top
0% stocks are considered winners and the bottom 30% stock
re considered losers. Skipping one month, I buy winners and
ell losers in month t + 1, and hold this position for three months.
 use two measures HHI ranks and HHI of every industry in a
ountry to proxy for the competition intensity in the following
wo models.
ntra  Momentumik =  β0 +  β1 × HHI  Rankik
+  β2 ×  RMk +  β3 ×  SMLk +  β4 ×  HMLk +  ; (1)
ntra Momentumik =  β0 +  β1 × HHIik
+  β2 ×  RMk +  β3 ×  SMLk +  β4 ×  HMLk +  ; (2)
here Intra  Momentumik is the annualized intra-industry
omentum of industry i in country k, HHI  Rankik is the rank
f HHI of industry i in country k, and HHIik is HHI of industry i
n country k. Following Fama and French (1993), I compute the
hree stock market factors for each month from January 1990
o December 2010. RMk stands for the market risk premium
ach month in country k, SMLk is the difference in stock returns
etween small and large size portfolios each month in country
, and HMLk is the stock return difference between high and low
ook-to-market portfolios each month in country k.
Table 3 presents the Fama–MacBeth cross-sectional regres-
ions of annualized intra-industry momentum returns on product
arket competition proxies. Newey–West heteroskedasticity
nd autocorrelation estimates of standard errors are used to com-
ute the t-statistics on the Fama–MacBeth coefficients. I conduct
he regressions in the full sample, the U.S., non-U.S. coun-
ries, the G7 countries, sub-period 1990–2000, and sub-period
001–2010. Country-fixed effects are controlled and t-values
re reported in parentheses under the coefficients. HHI ranks
a
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re used to measure competition in Models 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11.
ower ranks indicate competitive industries and higher ranks
ndicate concentrated industries. Models 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12
easure the competitiveness by HHI.
In Model 1, the coefficient of HHI rank is −0.005 with
 significance level of 5%, suggesting that when the HHI
ank increase by one, the annualized intra-industry momentum
eturns decrease by 0.5%. In Model 2, the coefficient of HHI is
0.081 with a significance level of 10%, implying that when
HI increases by one, the annualized relative strength returns
ecrease by 0.81%. The results are economically and statis-
ically consistent for the U.S., non-U.S. countries, sub-period
990–2000 and sub-period 2001–2010. In the G7 countries, the
oefficient of HHI rank is significant at 10% (Model 7); though
he coefficient of HHI is not significant, it shows a negative
elationship between intra-industry momentum and competition
ntensity (Model 8).
In conclusion, the results in Table 3 confirm the hypothesis
hat intra-industry momentum is more pronounced in compet-
tive industries. Firms in very competitive industries need to
ake optimal operating decisions to thrive in the severely com-
etitive environment. Failure to do so would probably lead to
ankruptcy and job loss. Any mistake they make can be fatal to
he firms. This can explain the significant momentum profits in
ompetitive industries.
.4.  52-Week  high  strategy  and  intra-industry  momentum
eturns
In the preceding sub-section, I employ 12-month/3-month
trategy to determine the past winners and losers. To explore
hether the results are robust to different strategies, I use the
earness of a stock’s price to the 52-week high strategy (George
nd Hwang, 2004) to determine the past winners and losers. I
eplace the dependent variables of Models 1 and 2 with 52-week
igh momentum returns within each HHI portfolio.
Table 4 is identical to Table 3, except that the dependent
ariables are annualized intra-industry momentum profits deter-
ined by 52-week high stock returns. It demonstrates the results
f Fama–MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of intra-industry
omentum returns on product market competition proxies. HHI
anks are used to measure competition intensity in Models 1, 3,
, 7, 9, and 11. In Models 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12, I measure the com-
etitiveness by HHI. Similar to Table 3, the 12 models provide
ersistent results, which are robust across different sub-samples
periods) and different measures of product market competi-
ion. 52-week high strategy generates more economically and
tatistically significant intra-industry momentum returns than
2-month/3-month strategy, which is consistent with George and
wang (2004)’s finding that 52-week high strategy has better
redictive power to identify winners.
.5.  Intra-industry  momentum,  inter-industry  momentum,
nd overall  momentum
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) argue that industry momen-
um investment strategies, which buy stocks from past winning
22 T. Li / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 16–25
Table 3
Intra-industry momentum and cross-sectional analysis.
All countries The U.S. Non-U.S. countries G7 countries 1990–2000 2001–2010
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
HHI Rankik −0.005** −0.007** −0.005** −0.003* −0.007* −0.005*
(−2.33) (−1.98) (−2.09) (−1.74) (−1.78) (−1.91)
HHIik −0.081* −0.333* −0.079* −0.016 −0.110* −0.049*
(−1.80) (−1.76) (−1.74) (−1.23) (−1.76) (−1.91)
RMk −13.669 −17.339 0.062 0.117 0.711 2.064 0.416 0.409 −29.426 −37.192
(−0.97) (−0.98) (0.27) (0.50) (0.97) (0.99) (0.38) (0.35) (−1.00) (−1.00)
SMBk −17.645 −21.981 0.086 0.101 0.312 0.512 −0.560 −0.389 −36.757 −46.136
(−1.05) (−1.03) (0.17) (0.22) (0.83) (1.47) (−0.45) (−0.29) (−1.04) (−1.03)
HMLk 9.260 12.163 0.909 0.849 1.681 4.027 −2.538 −2.490 22.458 28.555
(0.85) (0.89) (0.86) (0.89) (1.35) (1.14) (−1.40) (−1.31) (0.99) (1.00)
Intercept 7.531 9.539 0.030 0.019 0.310 0.284 −0.094 −0.400 0.362 0.408* 15.550 19.753
(0.98) (0.99) (1.06) (0.67) (1.08) (1.08) (−0.47) (−0.72) (1.56) (1.66) (0.96) (0.97)
NObs 37,659 37,659 2500 2500 35,159 35,159 16,414 16,414 18,028 18,028 19,631 19,631
Adj R2 6.1% 6.6% 1.6% 9.2% 5.7% 6.2% 6.5% 8.8% 7.5% 8.0% 4.5% 4.9%
This table provides the Fama–MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of annualized intra-industry momentum returns on product market competition. I conduct the
regressions in the full sample, the U.S., non-U.S. countries, the G7 countries, sub-period 1990–2000, and sub-period 2001–2010. HHI Rankik is the rank of HHI of
industry i in country k, and HHIik is HHI of industry i in country k. RMk stands for the market risk premium each month of every country k, SMLk is the difference in
stock returns between small and large size portfolios each month of every country k, and HMLk is the stock return difference between high and low book-to-market
portfolios each month of every country k. Newey–West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation estimates of standard errors are used to compute the t-statistics on the
Fama–MacBeth coefficients. Country-fixed effects are controlled and t-values are reported in parentheses under the coefficients. The sample period is from January
1990 to December 2010.
* Statistical significance at 10% level.
** Statistical significance at 5% level.
***Statistical significance at 1% level.
Table 4
52-Week high intra-industry momentum and cross-sectional analysis.
All countries The U.S. Non-U.S. countries G7 countries 1990–2000 2001–2010
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
HHI Rankik −0.008*** −0.013*** −0.008*** −0.009** −0.009*** −0.007*
(−3.26) (−3.15) (−2.86) (−2.55) (−2.82) (−1.77)
HHIik −0.119** −0.980** −0.110** −0.150* −0.159** −0.070*
(−2.50) (−2.36) (−2.41) (−1.96) (−2.18) (−1.74)
RMk −21.387 −34.269 −0.100 −0.032 −1.932 −2.108 0.217 −0.114 −47.549 −75.630
(−1.09) (−1.05) (−0.43) (−0.13) (−1.26) (−1.27) (0.28) (−0.20) (−1.11) (−1.06)
SMLk −32.899 −46.167 −0.253 −0.210 0.018 0.258 0.047 −0.223 −72.796 −101.80
(−1.31) (−1.17) (−0.96) (−0.74) (0.03) (0.42) (0.07) (−0.40) (−1.33) (−1.18)
HMLk 6.988 19.268 −0.038 −0.287 −2.485 −2.814 −1.330 −0.892 17.061 43.682
(0.41) (0.75) (−0.11) (−0.70) (−0.94) (−0.99) (−0.98) (−0.97) (0.46) (0.77)
Intercept 15.981 21.599 −0.040 −0.051 0.156 0.101 0.406 0.424 0.266 0.240 35.011 47.465
(1.36) (1.20) (−1.25) (−1.48) (0.84) (0.57) (0.91) (0.84) (1.29) (1.40) (1.37) (1.20)
NObs 33,949 33,949 2374 2374 31,575 31,575 15,212 15,212 16,885 16,885 17,064 17,064
Adj R2 9.9% 10.3% 3.2% 10.4% 8.9% 9.3% 11.2% 13.2% 10.1% 10.5% 9.7% 10.0%
This table presents the Fama–MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of annualized intra-industry momentum returns on product market competition, when the nearness
to 52-week high strategy (George and Hwang, 2004) is used to determine the past winners and losers. I conduct the regressions in the full sample, the U.S., non-U.S.
countries, the G7 countries, sub-period 1990–2000, and sub-period 2001–2010. HHI Rankik is the rank of HHI of industry i in country k, and HHIik is HHI of industry
i in country k. RMk stands for the market risk premium each month of every country k, SMLk is the difference in stock returns between small and large size portfolios
each month of every country k, and HMLk is the stock return difference between high and low book-to-market portfolios each month of every country k. Newey–West
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation estimates of standard errors are used to compute the t-statistics on the Fama–MacBeth coefficients. Country-fixed effects are
controlled and t-values are reported in parentheses under the coefficients. The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2010.
* Statistical significance at 10% level.
** Statistical significance at 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at 1% level.
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Table 5
Intra-industry momentum, inter-industry momentum, and overall stock momen-
tum returns.
Intra Momentum Inter Momentum Overall Momentum
Panel A: all countries
0.070*** 0.069*** 0.064***
(6.08) (6.32) (6.33)
Panel B: the U.S.
0.010** 0.043*** 0.015**
(2.38) (3.34) (2.37)
Panel C: non-U.S. countries
0.073*** 0.070*** 0.067***
(6.09) (6.18) (6.40)
Panel D: G7 countries
0.073*** 0.072*** 0.064***
(4.68) (4.05) (4.28)
Panel E: 1990–2000
0.066*** 0.077*** 0.062***
(4.35) (4.60) (5.00)
Panel F: 2001–2010
0.074*** 0.060*** 0.066***
(4.24) (4.36) (4.08)
This table reports the average annualized momentum profits generated by intra-
industry, inter-industry, and overall momentum strategies in the full sample
(Panel A), the U.S. (Panel B), the non-U.S. countries (Panel C), the G7 coun-
tries (Panel D), sub-period 1990–2000 (Panel E), and sub-period 2001–2010
(Panel F). Intra Momentum is the intra-industry momentum profits generated
in competitive industries. Inter Momentum is Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)
inter-industry momentum profits. Overall Momentum stands for Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) individual stock momentum returns. The t-values for the means
are reported in the parentheses below the values. The sample period is from
January 1990 to December 2010.
*Statistical significance at 10% level.
** Statistical significance at 5% level.
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ndustries and sell stocks from past losing industries, account
or much of the individual stock momentum profits. I take
oskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) industry momentum as inter-
ndustry momentum. In this subsection, I compare the profits
f different momentum strategies, and investigate if momen-
um returns generated by the most competitive industries can
xplain more individual stock momentum returns in compar-
son with inter-industry momentum returns. Every month, I
ompute three average momentum returns for every country:
ntra-industry momentum returns from the most competi-
ive industries, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) inter-industry
omentum, and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) overall stock
omentum returns.
To compute the overall momentum returns (Over-
ll Momentumk), I employ Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
2-month/3-month momentum strategy among all the firms
n every country k. In each country, according to the stock
erformance over the past 12 months, I take the top 30%
rms as winners and the bottom 30% firms as losers, and
old the zero-cost portfolios of buying winners and selling
osers for 3 months after skipping one month. The annu-
lized average returns of this position are taken as overall
omentum returns. As for the intra-industry momentum of com-
etitive industries (Intra  Momentumk), based on the ascending
rder of HHI in country k, I take the top one (when there
re four or five industries in one country) or two industries
when the countries have more than five industries) as highly
ompetitive industries. Based on the past 12 month perfor-
ance, every industry’s top 30% stocks are winners and bottom
0% stocks are losers. I only buy past winners and sell past
osers in competitive industries, hold this position for three
onths after skipping one month, and compute the annual-
zed average returns as intra-industry momentum returns of
ompetitive industries. To compute the inter-industry momen-
um profits (Inter  Momentumk), I calculate the average stock
eturns of every industry for the past 12 months in each coun-
ry. The top 30% performance industries are winners and the
ottom 30% industries are losers. I hold the position of buy-
ng winner industries and selling loser industries for three
onths after skipping one month, and take the annualized
verage returns of this position as inter-industry momentum
eturns.
Table 5 presents the average annualized momentum prof-
ts generated by intra-industry, inter-industry, and overall
omentum strategies, respectively. It also reports the t-
alues in parentheses for the means of momentum profits.
n the samples of all countries (Panel A), non-U.S. coun-
ries (Panel C), the G7 countries (Panel D), and sub-period
001–2010 (Panel F), intra-industry momentum strategy gen-
rates more momentum profits compared with inter-industry
nd overall momentum strategies. In the U.S. (Panel B) and
ub-period 1990–2000 (Panel E), inter-industry momentum
trategy outperforms intra-industry momentum and overall
omentum strategies. I claim that in non-U.S. countries
nd in sub-period 2001–2010, intra-industry momentum strat-
gy is more profitable than the other two momentum
trategies.
i
4
i
e** Statistical significance at 1% level.
Furthermore, I examine the relationship between the three
omentum strategies by Model 3.
verall  Momentumk =  β0 +  β1 × Intra  Momentumk
+  β3 ×  Inter  Momentumk +  β3 ×  RMk
+  β4 ×  SMLk +  β5 ×  HMLk +  ; (3)
here RMk, SMLk, and HMLk are Fama and French (1993)
arket factors defined in Models 1 and 2. Table 6 reports
he OLS regression results of overall stock momentum returns
n the intra-momentum returns from competitive industries
nd the inter-industry momentum. I conduct the regressions
n the full sample, the U.S., non-U.S. countries, the G7
ountries, sub-period 1990–2000, and sub-period 2001–2010,
espectively. In Model 1, the coefficient of Intra  Momentumik
Inter  Momentumik) is 0.493 (0.304) significant at 1%, indicat-
ng that when intra-industry (inter-industry) momentum returns
ncrease by 10%, the overall momentum returns increase by
.93% (3.04%). The overall momentum profits are more closely
nteracted with intra-industry relative strength returns. Mod-
ls 2–5 provide consistent results that momentum returns from
24 T. Li / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 16–25
Table 6
Momentum returns from competitive industries and individual stock momentum returns.
All countries The U.S. Non-U.S. countries G7 countries 1990–2000 2001–2010
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intra Momentumk 0.493*** 0.867*** 0.488*** 0.651*** 0.467*** 0.517***
(54.70) (22.94) (59.24) (52.93) (42.9) (43.69)
Inter Momentumk 0.304*** 0.317*** 0.297*** 0.245*** 0.266*** 0.346***
(33.98) (12.34) (32.01) (24.04) (21.98) (25.82)
RMk −0.024*** −0.020 −0.023*** −0.017*** −0.019*** −0.024***
(−4.97) (−1.43) (−4.65) (−3.02) (−2.80) (−3.82)
SMLk −0.020*** 0.014 −0.020*** −0.011 −0.030*** 0.001
(−3.47) (0.68) (−2.80) (−1.31) (−3.2) (0.09)
HMLk −0.015* 0.009 −0.014** −0.007 −0.041*** 0.014
(−1.89) (0.44) (−2.15) (−0.91) (−4.84) (1.4)
Intercept −0.039 −0.036 −0.034 0.011 0.005 −0.066
(−1.81) (−1.13) (−1.49) (0.57) (0.2) (−2.69)
NObs 4585 247 4338 1723 2400 2185
Adj R2 61.30% 89.12% 60.57% 74.49% 55.27% 68.65%
This table illustrates the OLS regression results of overall stock momentum returns on the intra-industry momentum profits from competitive industries and the
inter-industry momentum profits. I conduct the regressions in the full sample, the U.S., non-U.S. countries, the G7 countries, sub-period 1990–2000, and sub-period
2001–2010. The dependent variables are Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) overall momentum returns in country k (Overall Momentumk). Intra Momentumk is the
intra-industry momentum profits generated in competitive industries of country k. Inter Momentumk is Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) inter-industry momentum in
country k. RMk stands for the market risk premium each month of every country k, SMLk is the difference in stock returns between small and large size portfolios each
month of every country k, and HMLk is the stock return difference between high and low book-to-market portfolios each month of every country k. Country-fixed
and year-fixed effects are controlled and t-values are reported in parentheses under the coefficients. The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2010.
* Statistical significance at 10% level.
*
c
s
5
1
p
r
m
m
w
p
w
i
w
p
m
a
(
s
c
o
m
c
i
t
e
p
fi
p
s
i
i
R
A
A
C
C
C
C
C
F
F
J. Polit. Econ., 607–636.** Statistical significance at 5% level.
** Statistical significance at 1% level.
ompetitive industries are more strongly associated with overall
tock momentum profits.
.  Conclusion
Focusing on firms from 19 countries in the period of
990–2010, this study explores whether product market com-
etition has a positive influence on intra-industry momentum
eturns. I use Herfindahl–Hirschman Index to measure product
arket competition and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 12-
onth/3-month strategy to construct the zero-cost portfolio
ithin each industry. In addition, I take the nearness of a stock’s
rice to the 52-week high as an alternative measure to identify
inners and losers in each industry. I find that in competitive
ndustries, relative strength returns generated by buying past
inners and selling past losers are higher. Competition has a
ositive impact on return continuations.
Furthermore, I also compare intra-industry momentum pre-
iums generated in competitive industries with the Moskowitz
nd Grinblatt (1999) inter-industry and Jegadeesh and Titman
1993) overall stock momentum profits. The empirical results
uggest that in most cases, buying winners and selling losers in
ompetitive industries receives more momentum profits than the
ther two strategies. Regression results imply that intra-industry
omentum returns arising from competitive industries are morelosely related to overall momentum premium, in contrast to the
nter-industry momentum strategy.
The findings in my study are consistent with the notion that
ough competition forces management to improve operational
G
Gfficiency and financial performance. Once a firm in the com-
etitive industry falls into the group of losers, it is not easy for the
rm to bring about an upswing. But for a firm in an oligopolistic
roduct market, it does not hurt to fall into the group of losers,
ince the firm does not need to worry about its position in that
ndustry. Thus buying winners and selling losers in a competitive
ndustry generates more significant momentum returns.
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